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This paper analyzes the regional characteristics and strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in 
the world cosmetics and toiletries industry, based on the new work by Rugman on regional strategy. 
We test the proposition that MNEs may asymmetrically develop their upstream and downstream firm 
specific advantages (FSAs). We find that the upstream activities of the MNEs in cosmetics are home 
region based but that downstream activities are less so. Further, the asymmetry of FSAs in the world 
cosmetics industry is mainly due to the atypical Asian entry strategies of North American and West 




Keywords: regionalism, regional strategy, cosmetics industry, firm specific advantage, Avon, 
Gucci   2
Introduction 
In a previous article in this journal, Rugman and Collinson (2004) examined the international activity 
of the world’s largest automobile companies. They reported that these so-called global firms in fact 
are all operating on a regional basis, with an average of 80 percent of their sales within their home 
region. In this paper this regional lens is applied to the world cosmetics industry. Two advances are 
introduced. First, as well as the sales of these firms, their assets will be considered. Second, the 
presence and performance of world cosmetics firms is examined in a regional context for the first 
time. 
  Rugman (2000, 2005) and Rugman and Verbeke (2004) show that the largest multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) utilize not a global strategy but a home region-based strategy as they go into 
foreign markets. Several related studies have examined the regional characteristics of MNEs at the 
industry level: the automotive sector (Rugman and Collinson, 2004); the retail sector (Rugman and 
Girod, 2003). There are also several studies at region/country level: Europe (Rugman and Collinson, 
2005); Japan (Rugman and Collinson, 2006). Some earlier work also implicitly discusses regional 
strategy. In particular, Johansson and Vahlne (1977) show that firms select geographically and 
culturally similar markets to overcome the liability of foreignness. Davidson (1983) suggests that 
similarities in supply, demand, and uncertainty encourage foreign entry. Ohmae (1985) notes that 
MNEs can take advantage of customer similarities among nations, and he was the first to define broad 
regions in the triad space: North America; Western Europe; and Japan. 
Schlie and Yip (2005) suggest that regionalization and regional strategy could evolve as a 
better solution than their global counterparts because MNEs confront two pressures: total 
globalization barriers and competitive regionalization advantages. After analyzing the world 
automotive industry, they further argue that regional strategies could be associated with a more rather 
than less advanced stage in the evolution of firm’s global strategy. We do not believe this; there are 
many large MNEs (LMNEs) reporting a regional strategy but they clearly do not ever have a global 
strategy. However, to better test this it is necessary to move on from looking at sales data and also 
consider assets, as we do here. Rugman (2005) in fact already examined the downstream activity   3
(sales) of LMNEs. Here we extend this work with a comparative analysis of the upstream (assets) and 
downstream (sales) firm specific advantages (FSAs) of subsidiary business units. Moreover, this study 
analyzes not only LMNEs but also smaller MNEs in the cosmetics and toiletries (henceforth 
cosmetics) industry and compares their international strategies. We find that the development of 
upstream activities in small cosmetics MNEs lags behind the growth of downstream activities, 
compared to larger cosmetics MNEs. This asymmetry comes from North American and West 
European MNEs’ entry strategy in the Asian market. By comparing upstream and downstream FSAs 
in the regional context, we also study and compare the strategies of Avon and Gucci. 
  We proceed as follows. In the next section, we describe the data and review background 
information about the world cosmetics industry. After examining the regional characteristics of the 
cosmetics industry and the asymmetry between upstream FSAs and downstream FSAs, we review two 
cases of internationalization strategy. We conclude with a discussion of the contribution and 
managerial implication of this study. 
 
The World Cosmetics Industry 
In this paper, we focus on the regional sales and localized operation (assets) of the world’s largest 100 
cosmetics companies for 2003. The list of the world’s largest 100 cosmetics companies and its 
cosmetics sales come from the Woman’s Wear Daily (WWD) magazine, and the list is reported in 
Appendix A.
1  France based L’Oréal had sales of 15.5 billion US dollars worldwide in 2003, and 
Proctor and Gamble, Unilever, Shiseido, and Estée Lauder were next, while Perricone MD is the 
smallest firm with sales of 52 million US dollars worldwide in 2003. The world cosmetics market is 
oligopolized by a few large companies; the largest company, L’Oréal, is about 300 times bigger than 
the 100th largest company, Perricone MD. 
Table 1 reports the number and average sales of firms by nationality and by home region. The 
cosmetics industry is regionally based, and firms based in North America and in West Europe account 
                                                 
1 WWD annually reports on the largest 100 cosmetics companies based on sales.   4
for approximately 86% of sales: 43% for each region. Firms based in Japan and South Korea also 
have substantial market share at 14%.
2 West European cosmetics companies have the largest portion, 
50%, in terms of number, but their average sales are the smallest, 960 million US dollars. Firms in the 
largest five countries (USA, UK, France, Germany and Japan) make up 93 % of sales. Except for 
eight Brazilian, Russian, and South Korean companies all firms have their headquarters in developed 
countries. Based on Euromonitor’s (2003) estimation of world market size, the largest 100 companies 
make up 60 % of the world market. 
Table 1 is approximately here 
 
  We divide the largest 100 cosmetics companies into LMNEs and small MNEs (SMNEs) 
based on their sales in 2003. Sales of LMNEs are at least $1 billion in 2003, while those of SMNE are 
less than $1 billion. In this way 34 companies are categorized as LMNEs among cosmetics 
companies, while 66 companies are categorized as SMNEs. Among the 34 LMNEs, 27 firms (such as 
L’Oréal, Shiseido, Estée Lauder, Avon) sold more than $1 billion of cosmetics products around the 
world, while seven companies (such as Gucci, Gillette, Liz Claiborne) sold more than $1 billion by 
including other product categories.
3 Using the list from WWD, we collect geographic sales data from 
the annual reports, World Scope, and COMPUSTAT. The geographic dispersion of sales data is 
available for 43 MNEs while the geographic dispersion of assets is available for 32 MNEs. Eleven 
MNEs only report their sales data in annual reports. Data availability is higher for LMNE than for 
SMNE; see Table 2.  
Table 2 is approximately here 
 
The Regional Nature of Multinational Enterprises in Cosmetics 
                                                 
2 We compare the sales from WWD and firms’ annual reports if both are available. The values are almost 
identical in either source excluding a few possible rounding errors. 
3 Proctor and Gamble acquired Gillette in 2005.    5
Current studies show that world economic activities are realized in the home regions of North 
America, Europe, and Japan/Asia (Rugman, 2000 and 2005; Rugman and Verbeke 2004). Among 
Rugman’s 380 MNEs, six MNEs are included in the world largest 100 cosmetics companies. These 
MNEs are categorized as one global MNE (LVMH), two bi-regional MNEs (L’Oréal, Unilever), and 
three home-region oriented MNEs (Henkel, Sara Lee, Proctor and Gamble). 
  Does the cosmetics industry use a global strategy? Previous work finds that brand is 
important (Steenkamp, Batra and Alden, 2003), and that maintaining the brand name needs a higher 
degree of control because of the free-riding problem (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Burt et al. 
(2005) explain that the beauty industry has two characteristics: high regulation and high consumer’s 
trust, which is built around well established world wide manufacturing brands. Davidson (1983) finds 
that scale economies can be achieved in supplying similar markets because existing resources such as 
brand names, packaging, product design, and pricing strategies can be readily transferred to similar 
markets. Managers will also prefer similar markets in order to minimize unexpected response to an 
established marketing mix. Brand equity can be achieved by a marketing mix such as place and 
promotion after penetrating the market. In general the cosmetics industry would be a home-region 
oriented industry to maximize FSAs (scale economies) and LSAs (market similarities). 
Seventy percent of sales occur in the home region, and SMNEs rely more on home-region 
sales than LMNEs. The value is very close with the intra-regional sales of the largest 500 companies, 
71.9%. Using Rugman’s classification (2004, 2005) of regional multinationals based on intra- and 
inter-regional sales, we classified cosmetics MNEs; see Table 3.
4  Approximately 80% of MNEs are 
categorized as home-region oriented in the sense of geographic dispersion of sales. Only 16% of 
MNEs actively participate in at least one foreign triad market. The evidence is more obvious when we 
use the geographic dispersion of assets data. All 32 cosmetics MNEs invest more than 50% of assets 
in their home region except Unilever, and the average of their intra-region assets is 84%. In particular 
                                                 
4 The definitions of classification are: home region (>50% of sales in the home region); bi-regional (<50% of 
sales in the home region but >20% in another region); host region (>50% of sales in another region of the triad); 
and global (<50% of sales in the home region and >20% in each region of the triad). We report categories of all 
cosmetics MNEs whose data are available in Appendix A.   6
SMNEs invest an average of 92.6% assets in the home region, and all of them are categorized as 
home-region oriented MNEs in the sense of geographic dispersion of assets. 
Table 3 is approximately here 
 
Rugman (2005) develops the regional matrix based on the basic matrix of CSA and FSA. On 
the horizontal axis of the regional matrix is shown the regional or global reach of FSAs of a firm, and 
on the vertical axis of the regional is shown the regional or global scope of the locational advantages 
of a firm. In Figure 1, we arrange the results of 43 cosmetics MNEs on the regional matrix. Among 
the world’s largest cosmetics MNEs, four (LVMH, Gucci, L’Oréal and Richemont SA) stand out as 
being the most global (quadrant 3) in terms of generating their revenue across the three triads of North 
America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. All are well known high-end cosmetics companies located in 
Europe, and L’Oréal is solely a cosmetics company.
5  High brand recognition and world standard 
products make them use global strategy. Three firms (Unilever, Bulgari, and Inter Parfums) are 
positioned in bi-regional of quadrant 4. Even though total sales of Bulgari and Inter Parfums are less 
than $1 billion (855 million and 186 million respectively) they have a significant presence in two 
triads. All three firms are also Europe based firms. The main brand of Bulgari and Inter Parfums are 
BVLGARI and Burberry; they also have strong brand equity. All Asian and North American firms are 
categorized in home-oriented and host-oriented MNEs (quadrant 2).  
  It is important to note the existence of quadrant 1; the firms in this quadrant cannot develop 
the complementary FSAs with a global reach that are required to exploit the global scope of their 
locational advantages. While the environment of international business is becoming more global, it is 
very difficult for firms to transfer their successful regional FSAs into global FSAs (Rugman, 2005). 
Avon Company is located solely in quadrant 1. 
Figure 1 is approximately here 
                                                 
5 LVMH(Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton) group retails Christian Dior, Guerlain, Kenzo, etc. Gucci group retails 
Yves Saint Laurent, etc. Richemont SA retails jewelry and watches such as Baume and Mercier, Cartier, Piaget, 
Dunhill, etc, and also retails perfumes for those brands.    7
 
The Downstream and Upstream Paths of Geographic Dispersion 
Rugman and Verbeke (2004) suggest that an asymmetry may exist between the MNE’s downstream 
and upstream FSAs. The average sales of Rugman’s 380 companies was $29.2 billion in 2001, and the 
average sales of our sample is $5.8 billion in 2003.
6  When we count only cosmetics sales of 
companies, the average sales is $2.0 billion. The size of these cosmetics companies is much smaller 
than that of the largest 500 companies.  
  Anderson and Gatignon (1986) suggest that starting from low-control modes, a firm is 
advised to exert more control for valuable brand names. Johansson and Vahne (1977) point out that 
firms typically start exporting to a country via an agent, later establish a sales subsidiary, and 
eventually, in some cases, begin production in the host country. Therefore SMNEs utilize FSAs 
available to achieve a broad geographic distribution of sales and then focus on FSAs to achieve 
sourcing and production for economies of scales. From the organizational capability perspective, 
MNEs change to high investment mode after reducing risk through attaining market information and 
achieving high brand recognition in the host market. However, it does not mean that the largest 500 
MNEs show the same pattern as cosmetics MNEs. The largest 500 MNEs enjoy a high capability in 
exploiting upstream activities compared to downstream activities. The largest MNEs that have 
extensive international experience can exploit their FSAs of production and sourcing in the host 
market more efficiently than SMNEs. 
Rugman (2005) defines downstream and upstream FSAs. Downstream FSAs, or customer end 
FSAs, refer to knowledge strengths deployed in activities with a direct interface with the customers; 
they are required to achieve successful market penetration. In contrast, upstream FSAs are deployed 
in activities that lack this direct interface but are critical to creating an efficient internal production 
system. He further suggests and presents a re-conceptualization of Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1998) 
                                                 
6 49 companies’ information is available for total sales in their annual reports and for cosmetics segments sales 
in either annual reports or WWD.   8
framework on “generic roles of national organizations” in the MNE. We apply our data to this 
framework and present it in Figure 2.  
Figure 2 is approximately here 
 
  The cosmetics MNEs’ strength of geographic scope upstream FSAs lags behind their 
downstream FSAs except for Avon. The dotted line is the old perspective of symmetric upstream and 
downstream FSAs, and the solid line is the trend line of cosmetics MNEs; see Figure 3. These 
findings contradict the hypothetical expansion path of the largest 500 companies in Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004), but they note that the exploitations of upstream and downstream FSAs are different 
with regard to firm specific and industry specific characteristics. The size of the MNEs in our sample 
is much smaller than that of the largest 500 companies, and as noted earlier the cosmetics industry has 
unique characteristics. When we consider the size of the MNEs in the sample, we may expect that the 
development of upstream FSAs is faster than that of downstream FSAs for the largest 500 companies. 
Figure 3 is approximately here 
 
North American and European cosmetics MNEs’ sales in their home region are approximately 
60%, and their sales in the two foreign triads are around 20% each on average. Asian cosmetics 
MNEs are more home region oriented; their sales are more than 90% in the home region and are less 
than 5% each of the two foreign triads (see Panel A in Table 4). However, we cannot find any 
preference of downstream activities between the two foreign triads. Each market is equally important 
in developing downstream FSAs. However, we observe the asymmetric preference of developing 
upstream FSAs in foreign regions. Panel B in Table 4 shows that European cosmetics MNEs invest 
20% of assets in the North American market, and North American cosmetics MNEs invest 30% of 
assets in the European market. Both North American and European cosmetics MNEs invest less than 
10% of their assets in the Asian market. Asian cosmetics MNEs invest more than 5% in each foreign 
triad, which is slightly higher than their sales in each region.   9
North American and European MNEs’(FDI) foreign direct investment in the Asian region is 
market seeking FDI, whereas their FDI in the other regions of the triad is well balanced among the 
market seeking, resource seeking, and strategic asset seeking motives for FDI, in terms of Dunning 
(1993). Even though cosmetics MNEs from the West have a substantial portion of sales in the Asian 
market, they do not actively exploit upstream FSAs in the market. The world’s leading MNEs have 
increased their production capabilities in fast-growing parts of developing countries (Nolan and 
Zhang, 200), but the leading cosmetics MNEs have not yet participated in this trend. The evidence of 
this section makes us conclude that an asymmetry between upstream and downstream FSAs in the 
world cosmetics industry exists for the Asian strategy of North American and European cosmetics 
MNEs. North American and European cosmetics MNEs need to develop upstream FSAs in the Asian 
market. 
Table 4 is approximately here 
 
Two Cases: Avon and Gucci  
As explained in the earlier section, cosmetics MNEs develop more downstream FSAs than upstream 
FSAs in the foreign region. Schlie and Yip (2005) argue that the globalization (internationalization) 
process inevitably leads to different patterns of development in various countries or regions of the 
world, or varying degrees of globalization, which in turn give rise to distinct regionalization trends. 
By carefully looking at Figure 2 we find two special cases of internationalization strategy in the 
world’s largest cosmetics MNEs. Avon used a different internationalization strategy from the general 
cosmetics MNEs. Gucci shows higher asymmetry than other large cosmetics MNEs. Avon and Gucci 
are well-known MNEs over the world. Business Week 
(http://bwnt.businessweek.com/brand/2003/index.asp) ranked brand values for Gucci and Avon as 
53
rd and 57
th respectively for 2003
7. In this section we explain why two similar MNEs develop 
different internationalization strategies. 
                                                 
7 Only Gillette, LVMH and L’Oréal have higher brand values than Avon and Gucci in the cosmetics industry.   10
 
Avon: The myth of globalization 
Avon, the world’s largest direct sales cosmetics company, is positioned in quadrant 1 in Figure 1. 
Avon is categorized as a home-oriented MNE, but it has 48% of assets (geographic scope of 
locational FSA) and 36% of sales (geographic reach of FSAs) in foreign regions. Avon can be 
categorized as quasi bi-regional in assets and home oriented in sales. Figure 2 shows that Avon’s 
geographic dispersion of upstream FSAs is spread over two triad regions, while its geographic 
dispersion of downstream FSAs is developed in only one triad.  
  Even though Avon made more than 60% of sales and profits in its home region (North 
America), it actively exploits upstream FSAs in two foreign regions. After starting its business in New 
York in 1886, Avon aggressively expanded its geographic sales channels; see Table 5. Avon 
established its first cross-border presence in Canada in 1914, and expanded its business into Puerto 
Rico and Venezuela in 1954 and Mexico in 1958, etc. The first business in a foreign triad was in the 
United Kingdom and Germany in 1959, and it also expanded its business in Europe: Italy, Spain, and 
France in 1966. The Asian-Pacific region was its last destination among three triads; it entered the 
Australian and Japanese markets in 1963 and in 1969 respectively. Currently, Avon does business in 
more than 120 countries and has continued its geographic expansion. Avon has entered 34 new 
markets since 1990. 
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) find that a higher degree of control is more efficient for 
technically sophisticated products and process, which tend to have higher proprietary content than 
unsophisticated products. Direct sales methods require high tacit knowledge and local responsiveness, 
and the local responsiveness is harder to exploit than sourcing or production advantages. As a direct 
sales company, Avon needs to exploit downstream FSAs and local responsiveness, but it could not 
attain a comparative advantage in downstream FSAs. Thus Avon exploits upstream FSAs as a 
supplement to its lack of downstream FSAs in host regions.  
Table 5 is approximately here 
   11
Gucci: from global to regional 
Gucci was founded in Italy in 1921. Gucci opened its first international store in New York in 1953, 
and in 1961 opened its London store, the first European store outside Italy.
8 With this early expansion 
into the foreign triad region its sales are quite balanced over the triad regions. Gucci’s regional sales 
in Asia are higher than its regional sales in Europe and America before 2000. Not only Gucci but also 
other European luxury goods retailers (LVMH and Richemont S.A.) also have 29% and 37% of sales 
in the Asian region.
9 Compared to geographic dispersion of sales, Gucci’s assets are concentrated in 
the home region. Gucci has invested more than 70% of assets in the home region. As one of the most 
famous luxury goods retailers, Gucci’s comparative advantage comes from the standardized, high 
quality products and the strong relationship with its supply channel. Therefore Gucci has maintained 
its upstream FSAs in the home region. 
However, Gucci has recently changed its international strategy. Gucci’s home region sales in 
2003 are almost double of that in 1996, and its geographic dispersion of assets is highly focused on 
the home region; see Table 6. Steenkamp, Batra and Alden (2003) show that Korean and US 
consumers have almost the same awareness of global brands. Therefore we can expect that global 
luxury brands will have no additional difficulties in penetrating the Asian market compared with the 
North American market. But big changes happened during 1999-2001. Gucci acquired several 
European based luxury goods firms during this period. Moreover, in 1999 it made a strategic alliance 
with a large French based retailer, Pinault-Printemps-Redoute S.A. Through this acquisition and 
alliance Gucci increased the ratio of its home region sales and assets. Now Gucci has a home regional 
strategy based on a strategic resource seeking international strategy. However, Gucci still needs to 
achieve a balance between upstream and downstream FSAs both in the home region and in the foreign 
regions. 
Table 6 is approximately here 
 
                                                 
8 It opened the first Asian store in Japan in 1972. 
9 Data of regional assets for LVMH and Richemont S.A.are unavailable.   12
Conclusions 
In this study, we have analyzed the asymmetry between upstream and downstream firm specific 
advantages (FSAs) as well as the regional characteristics of multinationals. Evidence from the largest 
one hundred cosmetics companies, in general, supports the regional nature of MNEs (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004). Cosmetics MNEs are home region oriented both in the geographic scope of upstream 
FSAs and of downstream FSAs. However, they develop a world distribution of sales across 
downstream activities more efficiently than for geographic upstream FSAs such as those derived from 
supply chain sourcing and production. In general, we find no evidence of a global supply chain for 
cosmetics MNEs; it is regional. The development of upstream activities in small cosmetics MNEs lags 
behind the growth of downstream activities, compared to larger cosmetics MNEs. 
  We further investigate that the asymmetry of the world cosmetics industry comes from the 
entry strategy of North American and European based cosmetics MNEs in the Asian market. Both 
North American and European cosmetics MNEs actively exploit downstream FSAs in the Asian 
region (not upstream FSAs). They balance the two FSAs in the other triad regions. Two interesting 
case studies arise in the real world cosmetics sector. Avon develops upstream FSAs more than 
downstream FSAs in foreign triads, while Gucci is concentrating on developing downstream FSAs in 
foreign triads. These two MNEs have to balance upstream FSAs and downstream FSAs in foreign 
regions as well as in their home region of the triad.  
An MNE may develop an internationalization strategy to reach maximum efficiency and 
profits based on its capability of utilizing upstream and downstream FSAs. Differences in country 
specific advantages and firm specific advantage affect an MNE’s strategic choice in the market. 
However MNEs should balance upstream and downstream FSAs. They cannot obtain sustainable 
competitive advantage when they focus only on what they do well. Asian countries should provide 
favorable investment conditions to attract foreign direct investment from the MNEs. Otherwise, the 
Asian region will not be an area where MNEs want to invest.   13
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Table 1 The World’s Largest 100 Cosmetics Companies 
 
 





America  United State  35  46,753   (42.56 %)  1,336 
  Canada  1  59      (0.05%)  59 
  Brazil  1  147      (0.13%)  147 
  Sub Total  37  46,959   (42.75%)  1,269 
Europe  France  16  25,082    (22.83%)  1,567 
  Italy  10  1,843     (1.51%)  166 
  Germany  9  6,599     (6.01%)  733 
  United Kingdom  4  10,835     (9.86%)  2,709 
  Switzerland  3  352     (0.32%)  117 
  Spain  2  1,440     (1.31%)  720 
  Russia  2  181     (0.16%)  91 
  Netherlands  1  696     (0.63%)  696 
  Ireland  1  206     (0.19%)  206 
  Sweden  1  738     (0.67%)  738 
  Sub Total  50  47,977   (43.67%)  960 
Asia  Japan  8  13,051   (11.88%)  1,631 
  South Korea  5  1,870     (1.70%)  374 
  Sub Total  13  14,921   (13.58%)  1,148 
Total   100  109,857  (100.00%)  1,098 
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Table 2 Large and Small Cosmetics Firms 
 
Data for Geographic Dispersion    Definition  Number of firms 
Sales Assets 
LMNE  Sales are at least 1 billion  33 25  21 
SMNE  Sales are less than 1 billion  67 18  11 
Total   100 43  32 
Sources: Geographic dispersion data for sales and assets come from annual reports, World Scope, and 
COMPUSTAT. Data of four companies, P&G, KAO, Pierre Fabre, Noevir, are unavailable for 2003, so 2004 
data are used in these cases. 
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Table 3 The Largest 100 Cosmetics Companies and their Intra-regional Sales 
 
 
Panel 1. Entire World Largest 100 Cosmetics companies 
 Sales  Operation  (Asset) 
Type of MNE  No.of 
MNEs 




% of 32  Intra-region 
Assets 
Global  4 9.3%  44.3%  1
* 3.1%  53.0% 
Bi-Regional  3 7.0%  48.4%  2
* 6.3%  50.8% 
Host-Region Oriented  2 4.7%  24.5%  0 0.0%  - 
Home-Region Oriented  34 79.0%  78.0%  29 90.6%  84.0% 
Sub-Total  43 100.0%  70.3%  32 100.0%  80.8% 
Insufficient Data  6 na  na 17 na  na
No Data  51 na  na 51 na  na
Total  100     100    
 
Panel 2. Large Multinational Enterprises (sales greater than 1 billion US $) 
 Sales  Operation  (Asset) 
Type of MNE  No.of 
MNEs 




% of 21  Intra-region 
Assets 
Global  4
* 16.0%  44.3%  1
* 4.8%  53.0% 
Bi-Regional  1 4.0%  50.3%  2
* 9.5%  50.7% 
Host-Region Oriented  1 4.0%  33.0%  0 0.0%  - 
Home-Region Oriented  19 76.0%  73.4%  18 85.7%  78.5% 
Sub-Total  25 100.0%  66.2%  21 100.0%  74.6% 
Insufficient Data  3 na  na  7 na  na 
No Data  5 na  na  5 na  na 
Total  33     33    
 
Panel 3. Small Multinational Enterprises (sales less than 1 billion US $) 
  Sales Operation  (Asset) 
Type of MNE  No.of 
MNEs 




% of 11  Intra-region 
Assets 
Global  0 0.0%  -  0 0.0%  - 
Bi-Regional  2 11.1%  47.5%  0  0.0%  - 
Host-Region Oriented  1 5.6%  16.0%  0 0.0%  - 
Home-Region Oriented  15 83.3%  84.0%  11  100.0%  92.6% 
Sub-Total  18 100.0%  76.1%  11 100.0%  92.6% 
Insufficient Data  3 na  na 10 na  na 
No Data  46 na  na 46 na  na 
Total  67     67    
Source: see sources in Table 2. 
Notes: * indicates that a quasi global and a quasi bi-regional MNE are included for each corresponding 
category. Quasi global MNE means that two host regions have more than 20 per cent of sales (assets) for each 
foreign region, but home region sales (assets) is slightly more than 50 per cent. L’Oréal’s geographic dispersion 
of sales consists of 52%, 28% and 20% for Europe, America and Asia respectively, and it is categorized as quasi 
global MNE in the sense of sales. Quasi bi-regional MNE means that only a host region has more than 20 per 
cent of sales (assets), but home region sales (assets) is slightly more than 50 per cent. Avon’s geographic 
dispersion of assets consists of 32%, 51% and 17% for Europe, America and Asia respectively, and it is 
categorized as quasi bi-regional MNE in the sense of assets. 
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Table 4 Geographic Dispersion of Sales and Assets by Home Region 
 
 
Panel A. Geographic Dispersion of Sales 
  Triad Region 
Home Region  Americas  Asia  Europe 
Americas  58.80 %  17.63 %  23.57 % 
Asia  3.46 %  92.42 %  4.12 % 
Europe  21.32 %  17.19 %  61.49 % 
 Total  30.18 %  30.77 %  39.05 % 
  
 
Panel B. Geographic Dispersion of Assets 
  Triad Region 
Home Region  Americas  Asia  Europe 
Americas  70.37 %  8.86 %  20.77 % 
Asia  6.25 %  87.05 %  6.70 % 
Europe  29.64 %  5.12 %  65.24 % 
Total  35.43 %  23.35 %  41.12 % 
     
Source: see sources in Table 2. 
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Americas  0.6264 0.6390 0.5123 0.5956 
Europe  0.2373 0.2407 0.3185 0.3131 
Asia  0.1363 0.1203 0.1692 0.0913 
      
Category 
 
Home-Region  Home-Region  Quasi bi-regional  Quasi bi-regional 
Source: Annual report 2003. 
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Table 6 Regional Sales and Assets of Gucci 
 Sales    Assets 
Year Americas  Asia  Europe    Americas Asia  Europe 
1996 0.33  0.45  0.22    0.17  0.15  0.68 
1997 0.30  0.45  0.25    0.18  0.14  0.68 
1998 0.29  0.41  0.30    0.16  0.17  0.67 
1999 0.29  0.40  0.31    0.07  0.07  0.86 
2000 0.25  0.33  0.42    0.09  0.07  0.84 
2001 0.22  0.35  0.43    0.10  0.07  0.83 
2002 0.22  0.34  0.44    0.11  0.07  0.82 
2003 0.22  0.33  0.45    0.10  0.09  0.81   21
Figure 1 The Regional Matrix and Cosmetics MNEs 
 
Geographic Reach of 
FSAs 


















“Myth of Globalization” 
Avon (L) 
3 














2                      
Home-Oriented (34/43) 
Estée Lauder (L), Shiseido (L) 









Inter Parfums (S) 
Sources: see sources in Table 2. 
Notes: * indicates Quasi-Global MNE; see note in Table 3. 
            Avon is categorized as a home-oriented MNE, but it has 48% of assets (geographic scope of locational 
FSA) in foreign region and 36% of sales (geographic reach of FSAs) in foreign region. Avon can be categorized 
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Figure 2 Generic Roles of Strategic Business Units (SBUs) in Cosmetics MNEs  
 
    Geographic Scope of SBU FSAs 





















































Sources: see sources in Table 2. 
Note. Number of geographic scope is counted when sales in the region are larger than 20 % of total sales.   23
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%  intra 
regional  Category 
%  intra 
regional  Category 
L'Oreal Group  France  Europe  15,500  52.1  D(Q)  53.0  D(Q) 
P&G USA  America  13,000  57.0  A  53.6  A 
Unilever PLC  GB  Europe  8,070  50.3  C  50.3  C 
Shiseido CO.LTD  Japan  Asia  5,270  82.1  A  70.3  A 
Estee Lauder Cosmetics Inc.  USA  America  5,100  57.7  A  67.8  A 
Avon Products Inc.  USA  America  4,490  62.6  A  51.2  C(Q) 
Beiersdorf AG  Germany  Europe  3,790  75.1  A  80.1  A 
Johnson & Johnson  USA  America  3,750  65.7  A  73.8  A 
Alberto Culver Co.  USA  America  2,750  77.1*  A  68.6*  A 
Kao Corp.  Japan  Asia  2,750  82.8  A  78.7  A 
Limited Brands  US  America  2,600  na    na   
LVMH Louis Vuitton  France  Europe  2,470  38.0  D  na   
Chanel France  Europe  2,240  na    na   
Colgate Palmolive  US  America  2,200  60.2  A  59.0  A 
Henkel KGAA  Germany  Europe  2,140  75.0  A  68.9  A 
The Boots Company PLC  GB  Europe  2,030  96.4*  A  96.0*  A 
Mary Kay Inc.  USA  America  1,800  na  na   
Alticor Inc.  USA  America  1,800  na  na   
Yves Rocher  France  Europe  1,720  na  na   
Coty Inc.  USA  America  1,700  33.0  B  na   
Kanebo Japan  Asia  1,680  na    na   
Kose Corp.  Japan  Asia  1,440  90.0*  A  90.0*  A 
Revlon Inc.  USA  America  1,300  64.4*  A  83.3*  A 
Amorepacific Corp.  Korea  Asia  1,090  na    na   
Sara Lee Corp.  US  America  1,080  68.8  A  81.7  A 
Group Clarins  France  Europe  1,000  78.4  A  93.1  A 
Puig Beauty and Fashion  Spain  Europe  990  73.0  A  77.8  A 
Pola Cosmetics Inc.  Japan  Asia  881  na  na   
Gillette Co.  US  America  864  na  na   
Elizabeth Arden Inc.  USA  America  814  77.0  A  95.5  A 
Oriflame Cosmetics  Sweden  Europe  738  90.8  A  98.2  A 
Gucci Group (PPR)  Netherlands  Europe  696  43.8  D  81.1  A 
Group Pierre Fabre  France  Europe  687  57.3*  A  94.4*  A 
The Body Shop   GB  Europe  623  71.1  A  81.3  A 
Nippon Menard Cosmetics   Japan  Asia  570  na  na   
Euroitalia Group  Italy Europe  504  na  na   
LG Household and Health   Korea  Asia  495  97.2  A  99.2  A 
Nu Skin Enterprises Inc.  USA  America  476  16.0  B  na   
Colomer Beauty and Prof.  Spain  Europe  450  na  na   
Clayton Dubilier and Rice   US  America  400  na  na   
Sisley France  Europe  373  na  na   
Noevir Co. LTD  Japan  Asia  355  90.0*  A  90.0*  A 
Markwins International  US  America  325  na    na   
DEL Laboratories  US  America  310  95.0*  A  na   
Tigi USA  America  250  na    na   
IWP Ireland  Europe  206  86.9*  A  na   
Liz Claiborne  US  America  200  77.9*  A  na   
Inter Parfums   GB  Europe  186  50.0  C  74.2  A 
Kelemata Group  France  Europe  181  na  na   
L'occitane France  Europe  175  na  na   
Mirato SPA  Italy  Europe  175  90.5  A  na   
Guaber Group  Italy  Europe  170  na    na   
Ales Group  France  Europe  170  62.0  A  83.8  A 
Johnson Publishing  US  America  170  na  na   











%  intra 
regional  Category 
%  intra 
regional  Category 
Eugene Perma  France  Europe  168  na  na   
Coreana Korea  Asia  159  97.9*  A  100.0*  A 
Diana De Shilva   Italy  Europe  158  na    na   
Bulgari Parfums  Swiss  Europe  155  45.0  C  na   
Combie INC.  US  America  154  na  na   
Micys (pupa)  Italy  Europe  149  na  na   
Maxim Marken   Germany Europe  147  na  na   
O Boticario  Brazil  America  147  na  na   
Schering-Plough   US  America  146  na  na   
Von Berg Cosmetics  US  America  137  na  na   
Laboratoires Sarbec  France  Europe  130  70.0*  A  100.0  A 
Kalina Russia  Europe  126  na  na   
Deborah Group  Italy  Europe  125  na  na   
Maurer + Wirtz   Germany  Europe  122  na  na   
Playtex Products   US  America  119  89.2*  A  96.5*  A 
Parfums de Coeur  US  America  118  na  na   
Diamond Products   US  America  113  na  na   
Lush LTD.  UK  Europe  112  na  na   
Versace Profumi  Italy  Europe  110  na  na   
Sony Culture Ent.  Japan  Asia  105  na  na   
Paglieri Profumi  Italy  Europe  102  na  na   
Weleda AG  Swiss  Europe  102  na  na   
Doctor Babor  Germany  Europe  101  na  na   
MD Beauty  US  America  100  na  na   
Financiere Richemont SA  Swiss  Europe  95  43.2  D  na   
Collistar Italy  Europe  93  na    na   
Tupperware US  America  91  92.3  A  93.8  A 
Marbert Germany  Europe  84  79.1*  A  na   
Parlux Fragrance  USA  America  81  64.8*  A  na   
Jacques Bogart  France  Europe  80  na  na   
Tanning Research   US  America  79  na  na   
Artdeco Germany  Europe  78  na  na   
Weruska & Joel SRL  Italy  Europe  76  na  na   
Fribad Germany  Europe  74  na  na   
Hankook Korea  Asia  72  98.0*  A  100.0*  A 
Guinot Group  France  Europe  71  na  na   
Murad US  America  67  na  na   
Mana Products  US  America  65  na  na   
Alcina Kosmetik  Germany  Europe  63  na  na   
Hermes France  Europe  61  na  na   
Riviera Concepts   Canada  America  59  na  na   
Parfume Parlour  France  Europe  56  na  na   
Russkaya Kosmetika  Russia  Europe  55  na  na   
Charmzone Korea  Asia  54  na  na   
Crabtree and Evelyn  US  America  52  na  na   
Perricone MD  US  America  52  na  na   
 
Source: see sources in Table 2. 
 Notes:  
a. Sales are total cosmetics sales in 2003 from WWD. 
b. A, B, C, and D represent Home-region oriented, Host-region oriented, Bi-regional, and Global multinationals respectively. 
b.* indicates portion of Home-country sales (assets) respect to total sales (assets). 
d. (Q) indicates Quasi-; see notes in table 4. 
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